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CONFLICTING EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING THE CONFERENCE  
OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.

by Thorvald Stoltenberg

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ROBERT MURPHY

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The expectations that each of us have for the outcome of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are determined by our interpretation of the present situation and developments in international society, on how each one of us in fact defines the concept of security. I shall first try to list some of the major problems which mankind is confronted with at the end of the twentieth century and which to my mind make up the raw material of our long term security. Thereafter I shall point to certain lines of development that may possibly contribute to solve these problems. SALT I and II, the agreement between Warsaw-Bonn and between Moscow-Bonn as well as the Berlin-Agreement, CSCE and Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), should all be seen in this light, - as possibly important steps towards the solution of our basic problems, and not as ends in themselves.

Perhaps they should be seen as part of a mopping-up operation, a squaring away of the remains of certain European problems that are still with us, in order to clear the deck for an effort to solve more global and more alarming problems.

II Security questions are not isolated aspects of political affairs, involving certain parts of foreign policy only.

Security problems arise as the result of basic problems in national and world affairs, and as such embrace all foreign policy.

Foreign policy in its turn is no longer limited to its traditional task of regulating relations between states. Foreign policy is increasingly becoming a tool for the solutions of the most important problems confronting us today, including many of the internal problems of our separate countries.



Briefly these problems are:

- Lack of political and even more of a democratic political control of economic and technological development, both on the national and international level.

Governments are increasingly unable to fulfill their own goals and political programmes because of strong forces that are outside their control. This applies to all governments irrespective of political colour. Therefore all governments should have a common interest in trying to gain political control over developments, unless they adhere to a doctrine of "laissez-faire".

The difference between rich and poor countries is increasing, and even within individual countries we are unable to obliterate the problem of poverty. This situation persists in spite of all political declarations of intent to overcome it.

- War and terrorism.

Traditional warfare seems to have become more unlikely as a mode of action between states.

This does not mean, however, that there is international peace. Other forms of violence are increasingly taken into use, such as guerilla warfare, high-jacking, kidnappings and violent reprisals. Poverty, injustice and lack of democratic political control mean that



millions still feel that their only chance to change society and gain their rights as human beings is through the use of terrorism or simply by resorting to violence.

- Limited natural resources.

The growing understanding of the scarceness of natural resources in the world has created a more intense competition for the utilisation of those resources and has shown perhaps more clearly than any other factor the need for international planning, cooperation and control in order to ensure reasonable exploitation and more equitable distribution.

- Population.

The rampant population increase is closely connected to the problems of poverty and scarcity of resources, not only in the overpopulated developing countries, but increasingly also in the already industrialized societies.

- Environment - pollution.

The development of industry, chemical wastes and pollution in general, combined with rapidly increasing population, has put the question of control and preservation of the environment in the forefront of current problems.

In highly industrialized countries, people are questioning the value of economic growth without adequate political planning and control. The relevance of measuring growth in the traditional terms of GNP has been taken up for reassessment. The challenge



Is not economic growth or no growth, but - what sort of growth and how economic growth should be used and distributed.

This again inevitably brings in the problem of how to measure welfare and output in a tertiary economy.

Provided that we agree that these are the basic problems that confront us today, we must judge political developments, our actions, in relation to their possibility of contributing to a solution to these problems.

Till now, the postwar period has been characterized by pre-occupation with other problems, such as imbalance of power and military insecurity. To these we have tended to address ourselves with either a martial spirit or an overzealous sense of mission. These attitudes are inadequate in the painstaking political tasks of cooperation that lie before us.

The problems are global. They are not limited by geographic, political or national borders. Their solutions must be international solutions, arrived at in co-operation between governments, and between large organisations such as trade unions, consumer organisations and industrial organisations. It is highly doubtful whether individual countries will be able to resolve these issues alone. Economic, technological and political forces outside the control of any one country will probably obviate purely national efforts or at least make them enormously difficult. We live in an era of trans-national policies.



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I believe that when future historians come to characterize developments in Europe and Northern America, in the late 1960's <sup>and</sup> early 1970's, one of the characteristics will be the increasing understanding of the relationship or inter-relation between domestic and foreign policy. Before this period, foreign policy was by and large the exclusive reserve of a rather limited group of people, consisting of a few politicians, experts and journalists, who constituted the opinion-shaping and decision-making milieu in a country's foreign policy.

We are now experiencing a development toward a much broader participation in this decision-making process. The grass-root level is beginning to stir, either due to frustration, bewilderment and protest against the future shock and/or in deep concern and even alarm at the enormity and immediate danger of the issues which traditional foreign policy somehow has not been able to properly identify and certainly not to handle. There is a certain conflict in this: the conflict between, on the one hand, the complicated questions and mode of behaviour in international affairs which call for a kind of experience and expertise which rarely has been developed on the local levels, and, on the other hand, the feeling among ever broadening groups of the public that they see the issues and demand quick solutions. The tension between the need for expertise and the urge on the local level to participate in decisions that directly or indirectly are of imperative importance to the individual citizens, will be a factor to meet and resolve in the years to come, and will no doubt be an important factor in international relations, particularly in Western Europe and North America.



The increasing awareness of the influence of international development on domestic affairs, including everyday issues such as prices, income, employment and housing, has led large organisations like trade unions, industry, shipping, banking, the press and other massmedia, to see the need for developing their own capability in international affairs. It has also led to increasing activity on the part of non-parliamentary pressuregroups. This is due to the fact that there are no well-organised and natural channels of influence between the individual on the local level and the decisions in foreign policy. Many countries have developed a reasonably rational network of public influence in the shaping of, say, the national income tax system, with due hearing of most of the groups concerned. The same is not felt to be true, and is not true, for the shaping of foreign policy.

I said that future historians will note the increasing awareness in the past decade of what these external and common enemies are. I am afraid that they will also note to what little extent we have begun to organise ourselves to fight them.

We have the awareness of the problems, we probably also have, or could develop the technical means to solve them. What we lack is the organisation and cooperative political will. It may be said about us that we sit watching, terrorstricken, the coming of the deluge, instead of getting up to organise an adequate response to the challenge. It is a question of organisation, international organisation, and in this direction we have developed only the most rudimentary traces. In fact, some recent developments are counter-productive: the stress in many countries both rich and poor on national sovereignty, and our unwillingness to commit ourselves to long-term cooperation if it means giving up even minor short-term national advan-

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tages. These are alarming trends which make it far from certain whether we will actually be able to meet the challenge in time.

It is difficult to establish to what extent this interpretation of the international situation is a conscious motive behind the development toward CSCE/MBFR.

Anyhow, the more immediate historical facts could not be excluded from this framework of the present situation.

Tszechoslovakia 1968 became in this connection an important turning point for both the East and West European countries.

For the Soviet Union, developments in Tszechoslovakia clearly demonstrated the need to consolidate an unstable situation. For western countries it became evident that security problems in Europe also are closely linked to antagonism and tensions in Eastern Europe. The whole of Europe thus became dependent on the shaping of a basis for European relations that would minimize Soviet concern for security consequences of development in Eastern Europe.

This fact in itself is reason enough for a CSCE. Then came Willy Brandt's foreign policy which opened up for new possibilities of realistic results of multilateral East/West contacts in Europe.

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This is the framework in which the CSCE and the MBFR talks must be viewed.

CSCE and MBFR are examples of multinational efforts to deal with basic problems. They represent foreign policy not in its traditional manner of dealing merely with relations

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between countries, but in the common efforts of states to meet an "external threat". The tendency towards regional integration in various parts of the world should be seen in this same context. Such integration is a response to the need for political bodies with the possibility to develop the power and authority to act on behalf of a group of states, in order to try to regain some of the political influence on developments that gradually was lost during the post-war years.

While industry and capital long ago have effectively crossed political and geographic borders, political bodies and large organisations like the trade unions have operationally stayed behind within the old traditional national borders. This development have to a great extent increased the gap between economic and technological development and political planning and control.

The pressure generated by the emergence of the new problems on the horizon of our consciousness has contributed to an international change of priorities, not the least in the United States and the Soviet Union, but also in other nations. This is important in making it possible to handle the preparatory Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the preparation for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

There will be no security, if security is limited to a costly military defence against other nations, while at the same time, funds, energy and attention are not being diverted in sufficient amounts to the other looming problems. The need to go beyond a purely military definition of security, to enable ourselves to release funds, energy and

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resources to meet our common problems, to unlock our attentions towards other things is the main motivation for all the nations who meet in Helsinki and Vienna. This should not be forgotten in the wilderness of military and strategic speculations.

This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that what may be gained economically and politically by the two conferences may be transferred to other geographic areas of conflict, for instance the China - Soviet conflict or the Middle East.

To a considerable extent the agenda for the CSCE and the MBFR-talks seen as a whole, reflect the desire to get beyond the post-war military concerns and on to the solutions of our common problems.

- a/ questions of security, including principles guiding relations between the participants and appropriate measures, including certain military measures, aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability with a view to reducing the dangers of military confrontations.
- b/ Cooperation in the fields of economics and environment
  - development of commercial exchanges,
  - industrial cooperation and cooperation in the fields of development of raw materials and of energy resources
  - cooperation in other areas of economics,
  - cooperation in the field of environment.
- c/ Development of human contacts, broadening of cultural and educational exchanges and wider flow of information,

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- development of human contacts
- broadening of cultural exchanges
- broadening of contacts and exchanges in the field of education,
- wider flow of information.

The MBFR-talks and this agenda for the CSCE will constitute a broad range of discussions between all European states, the United States and Canada. Concrete and positive results will be of at least psychological importance for the further development of the issues on the agenda.

I have tried to place the CSCE in a broader context, into a framework of the general national and international development at the end of this century.

At this moment one knows the result, if any, of the CSCE and the MBFR-talks. Their only chance of success is that national, regional and all-European interests are considered to coincide.

The main short-term aim and justification of these meetings is that they may start a process towards the reduction of tension and growth of confidence between Eastern and Western European countries.

Beforehand one may take one of three possible attitudes towards the conferences: One may wait -phlegmatically for possible results, or one may take a pessimistic attitude, a rather fashionable scepticism, or one may look forward to the conferences with a sober optimism.



To approach the conferences with either indifference or pessimism, would hardly contribute to their success, and such attitudes might therefore turn out to become self-fulfilling prophecies. A sober optimism is therefore the politically necessary as well as a reasonably realistic attitude.

Speculations on the true motives behind proposals made by one or the other side or countries may be very frustrating exercises. They can, however, have some constructive value, if we try to connect motives with possible expectations. The long-term hopes for all parties involved in the preparations of CSCE and MBFR have been briefly sketched above.

The immediate motives differs probably from country to country in East as well as in West. Broadly speaking one may, however, say that what is generally recongnized as the motives of the Soviet Union in suggesting that the CSCE should be convened could be summed up in the following brief points :

- Consolidate and legitimate the status-quo including the Soviet position in Eastern Europe,
- multilateral recognition of the status-quo in Europe, particularly of the German situation. Such recognition will be a good substitute for a peace agreement which it is most unlikely will be achieved in the foreseeable future,
- increase import of Western technology and know-how
- a fragmentation of NATO,
- China. CSCE could mean more security, less tension



in Europe, thereby freeing more resources for dealing with Soviet relations to China,

- all-European cooperation is a way of preventing or diverting further West-European integration,
- Western Europe would in a process of détente relax politically and militarily,
- acceleration of US disengagement from Western Europe.

The United States or most of the NATO-countries' motives and possible expectations for a CSCE and MBFR, could probably be summarized as :

- Bilateral contacts in Europe are not any longer adequate for dealing with the overall problem of European security,
- BRG's interest and initiative in shaping a framework that gradually may change the "German problem" open up for possibilities for a development within binding regulations and with a guarantee against violence,
- US force reduction will come anyhow. It is better therefore to get it balanced and mutual than unilateral, or use East/West relations as a means of preventing UFR (Unilateral Force Reduction),
- change of status-quo would give more possibilities for East-European countries in their foreign policy,
- the possibilities of the smaller countries to take part in a process of decision-making concerning European security.

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Broad participation in the decision-making process of European security could easily result in no progress. This would again mean that the decisions which will have to be taken will actually be taken between the two super-powers, the United States and Soviet Union. This seems to be an insoluble conflict between democracy and effective results.

- Initiative is necessary from the Western countries in order not to come on the political defensive, both internationally and nationally.

An interesting development is the change of attitude on the part of the two sides which seems to have occurred over time.

The USSR originally promoted the CSCE while the NATO-countries were advocates of the MBFR. The preparatory talks have, however, to some extent brought the CSCE-initiative out of Soviet hands, and played it increasingly into the hands of the NATO-countries and neutral countries. On the other hand the MBFR-talks have, at least in the preparatory stage, given room for some initiative on the part of the USSR, which proposed that neutral countries should be included. The original attitudes towards these two conferences or talks may thus have become more balanced, a change which will probably contribute to the possibilities of success for the talks.

- ceiling on the defence budget,

This, of course, is an extremely complicated technical question, but equally complex in its political and psychological aspects. The mere fact of its being taken up for discussion may have a psychological impact. What is possible in politics will always to a large extent be the result of a long psychological process where former tabu-questions after a while come to be accepted.

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Results in the military-technological field of talks like the CSCE, MBFR and Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT) do not by themselves secure reduction of tensions, but may contribute to a growth of confidence and mutual trust.

Increasing cooperation and possible growth of confidence between Eastern and Western European countries will actually reduce the importance and possibilities of neutral non-aligned countries. This policy has a particular mission in "cold war" confrontation and lack of communication between the parties involved.

Decisions of major consequences for all-European cooperation are already in fact mainly a matter between the two military groupings - the Warsaw Pact and the NATO - or between the two super-powers, Washington and Moscow. The pattern of direct contacts would probably become even more pronounced in a possible future cooperation between Comecon and the European Community. Normalisation of cooperation in the whole of Europe will inevitably be effectuated through the super powers or the main military or economical groupings in Europe, after detailed and well-prepared bilateral contacts. This gives little room for choice or major influence on the part of those countries who do not belong to any of these groups.

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Cooperation or contact directly between COMECON and EC seems inevitable and desirable, even if such a development should leave out several European countries from the cooperation in the first round. Technological and economical developments that have implication for all of Europe and therefore demand a multilateral cooperation will press forward with urgency in the years to come.

All the countries involved have tended to stress the importance of a well prepared CSCE. There can be no doubt about the fact that the conference will be well prepared. Actually there is a much greater danger that no conference will be held at all because the excessive caution of the countries concerned, than that the conference will be badly prepared.

Whether or not these attempts to normalize relations in Europe will be successful, is not yet clear. There are many who fear that to break the present deadlock may only make Europe less secure than it is now. Both blocs are fully aware of this danger. It is unlikely that either of them will be prepared to permit the development of a situation in which their security will become less rather than more fully assured.

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The Soviet Union will be watchful concerning attempts on the part of her Eastern European allies to take too great liberties in moving to a greater degree of independence from her than they now possess. It is obvious that the Eastern European countries would be well advised to be cautious in exploiting the opportunities for more freedom of manoeuvre which the CSCE might give them. If they are not careful, grave political instability could endanger a more promising longterm development.

The Soviet Union also views with some concern the tendency that has come out during the preparations for the CSCE, towards a closer political cooperation between the EC-countries. The Soviet Union most probably would have nothing against this if it were assured that it is merely a natural stage in the development towards a broader all-European cooperation.

On the other hand, the Western European countries realize that if they do not develop common policies on those issues at the CSCE and MBFR that affect their vital interest, they will be at a considerable disadvantage compared to the United States, the Soviet Union and possibly even the other Warsaw Pact-countries in negotiations that concern the future of Europe. If the EC-countries place themselves at such disadvantage, the success of the conference will be less assured.

There are certain claims that the Eastern and Western countries are so wide apart in their understanding of what is



meant by European security, that the conferences may in fact be pointless. It is, however, precisely because there are differences of interest and outlook between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries that there is a European security problem. For this very reason it is necessary to develop a continuous dialogue between the two sides, with an infrastructure of permanent institutions in which these differences can be spelled out and confronted, in order that they may be reduced and eventually resolved. If the differences concerning the central issues of East/West relations prove over a long period of years to be fundamental, no progress can be expected on these questions, but progress may never the less be expected on a number of low-key, but substantive subjects of common concern.

The willingness to prepare for conferences such as the CSCE and MBFR - is in itself a sign of relaxation and change of priorities in international affairs. So far, Brandt's foreign policy, SALT I and II, the preparations of CSCE and MBFR - have not substantiated the claim that the differences are irreconcilable.

However, the immediate task is to limit the political consequences of imbalance and activities related to the necessity of armed forces. In this connection Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) may become concrete results of the CSCE/MBFR - development. The CBMs, including exchange of observers during manoeuvres, particularly in close proximity to national frontiers, advance notification of troop movements, may be the first stepping stone towards some more



trust and more confidence between the parties involved.

CBMs could in other words depoliticize military power in Europe. For countries like Germany and Norway, Romania and Yugoslavia, such measures would be of importance since these countries would be the first ones to meet the political effect of a military demonstration of power.

More significant in the long run than the progress that might be made on individual items would be the whole pattern of discussion and committee work over a wide range of topics that could be built up over a period of years in a series of conferences or in standing institutions. Through this political dialogue it might be possible to build up a bipartisan all-European interest, transcending bloc-divisions, that would bring about active East-West cooperation in tackling joint problems, such as a common campaign to preserve the human environment throughout the whole of Europe. The execution of any such joint policies that might be evolved would be entrusted to existing organisations, for instance the ECE at Geneva.

It seems inconceivable that a single CSCE or even a series of conferences could even in the near future bring about a solution to the major problems of the division of Europe, the principle benefit that could be expected to result from a CSCE would be the launching and eventually the successful development of a permanent political dialogue on major security, political, and other issues between the divided parts of Europe. It may be hoped that the creation of a dialogue of this kind will not in any way exclude bilateral



East/West contacts or inhibit them by channelling them through a CSCE. The conference and its follow-up should fill a major gap on the multilateral level and this be a supplement to bilateral contacts.

It remains to be seen whether the CSCE and MBFR might lead to a new institutionalized system of collective European security. For the future, it seems unlikely that either of the blocs, whose members are still extremely suspicious and fearful of each other, would consent to the dismantling of their own network of military security. Thus, although the political dialogue resulting from CSCE, MBFR, might control and minimize the antagonism resulting from the different economic and social systems of East and West and from the different ideological and political ends pursued by the NATO and Warsaw-Pact groupings, it is unlikely in itself to end such antagonism. As long as mutual hostility and suspicion remain, the members of the Atlantic Alliance are likely to insist on maintaining their own integrated defence capability, and in the East, the bilateral and multilateral defence agreement between the Warsaw-Pact countries are also likely to continue.

Any political dialogue which may be developed within the context of CSCE, will therefore in all likelihood be between countries which are members of the military pacts. It will not lead to the dissolution of these pacts in any near future. True, in the West it is argued that one of the main Soviet aims in advocating a conference is that it



would lead to a dissolution of NATO and its replacement by a collective European security system, dominated by the Soviet Union, from which the United States were excluded. An outcome of this kind would in no case be acceptable to the participating Western countries. They would refuse to agree to such a development, which must therefore be excluded as a practical possibility.

Nonetheless, it is still possible that in the long term there could be moves to replace the two existing blocs or to transform them into a new, all-European security system, in which the presence of the Soviet Union was balanced by that of the United States and Canada. Such a development would only be possible following the replacement of the existing degree of the mutual East-West mistrust and hostility by the growth of a greater degree of mutual confidence than exists at present together with the solution of the East/West ideological, political and territorial confrontation. Even if this seems to be a desirable development from a European point of view, it may not necessarily be what the rest of the world will be looking forward to. An all-European development should thus be linked to the regional integration that is taking place in other parts of the world. Such a link could represent the necessary guaranty against a confrontation between a rich, united world on one side and the rest of the world on the other.

The common cause in trying to solve the common basic problems - the external threat - will certainly be an important factor in prompting confident cooperation between all countries in Europe, and at the same time clear the way for cooperation with other regions of the world.

Thorvald Stoltenberg